I do not mean to suggest that hierarchical m::xlels are solely the invention of Western culture, although it does seem that the West has institutionalized and internalized such m::xlels rrore thoroughly than other peopies.
The Confucian tradition of China, for instance, is a thorough-going hierarchical m::xlel of social order based upon status roles in the htmliID family and extended to political and ethical structures.
Hindu social order is also rigidly and notoriously hierarchical. Even the Hopi Indians have a kind of inverted scale which places highest value upon those things closest to the earth, which is why the Hopi worship in underground kivas with the spiritual leader situated at a lCMer elevation than his atrlience.
And, as has been learned only recently, many animals are socially organized acoording to status roles oonferred by birth, behavior, or gender. Abundance evidence suggests that hierarchies are, in fact, principles of nature and that status within them defines an individual's rights and responsibilities. 
NATURE AND OTHER MOTHERS
There is good agreement am:mg the people of various ti.rres and cultures concerning the basic elements present in the world.
In nature there are celestial J:xxlies and rrovements, weather, plants and animals, and the land and water of the earth's surface.
In htmliID affairs there are families, problems of food and reproduction, social and political structures, and experiences of unseen realities of an errotional, spiritual, or religious sort.
There are males and females, strong and weak individuals, birth, sickness, and death, as well as love, joy, and pleasure. Cultural m::xlels agree well in their inventories of the world's significant canp:>nents, but they vary greatly in their assessrrent of the relationships arrong these components. Every culture finds its awn m::xlel of organization for them.
A favorite m::xlel of organization within Western culture has been the hierarchical scheme which arranges all elements of reality according to a vertical scale of sane sort. Anyone who has suffered education in our culture ]mCMS that every part of the standard curriculum is infonned by hierarchical criteria, both as the objects of study and as the methods for sttrlying.
The influences of this persistent m::xlel of reality are all around us: in philosofX1ical systems, literary forms, social institutions, political structures, educational organizations, scientific systems of classification, and in the laws and custans governing human behavior.
Wherever the Chain of Being has been applied, it has been asst.nned that value increases at each higher notch upon the scale. "IDwer" forms of existence are always less important than "higher" forms.
Further, the status of every element upon the vertical scale defines the rights that i t enjoys. God possesses all rights, while stones have none at all. Those of us who are neither gods nor rocks llU1st be oontent with an intennediate status and limited rights, with sane things possible for us and others impossible. All animals, incltrling humans, are such middle creatures.
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We have ccrne to accept the notion that there are lower forms of life and higher forms.
Even biologists testify to the validity of the chain and use its terminology in their laboratories and professional writings. The fX1ylogenetic scale canes out of Plato and Aristotle by way of Linnaeus, and it is nicely consistent with other versions of the Chain of Being.
Scientists who would never think of experimenting upon htmliID beings at the upper end of the scale are perfectly oontent to carve, drug, torture, oonfine, and redesign animals lCMer on the scale because their status allCM5 them no rroral rights to life, liberty, or to the pursuit of their own destinies.
And, as has been learned only recently, many animals are socially organized acoording to status roles oonferred by birth, behavior, or gender.
Natural hierarchies are nornally fOtUld only within given groups of conspecifics. '!be rank-order in a IOOngoose colony applies only to members of that colony, and it does not even affect neighboring colonies of IOOngooses, let alone other species living in the same area.
Humans alone have imagined that they p::>ssess a species status which elevates them above other species.
We are remarkable annng animals because of our attempts to live according to an imaginary interspecies daninance hierarchy.
other animals, of course, do knot know about the relative status they have been assigned in our system; so, they continue to disa~int us by ignoring our rules.
Confusion is bound to occur when a pattern of dominance developed within one species is extended to inclooe all species. One of the clearest examples of the problem is evident in the relative status of male and female human beings, which has long been mixed up in our minds with the relative status of mankind as a whole and nature as a whole.
Wanen and nature have occupied virtually the same status in the traditional structures of mythology, pililic imagery, fXti.losofily, and law. Whatever may be conceived of as "rights of nature" in any given period are likely to be consistent, if not identical, with that period I S conception of "the rights of wanen."
It is not merely coincidental that a renewed interest in the rights of natural environments should occur simultaneously with a massive social effort to redefine the rights and status of wanen.
For, as nature is thought of by ma.nk.i.nd, so will wanen be thought of by men.
As humans conceive the roles and rights of nature, so will men conceive the roles and rights of waren.
Neither nature nor wanan is as simple as both have been been assurred to be in IOOst hierarchical schemes. Nature is not merely a garden provided for mankind I S nourishment and canfort, but a canplex system with a capacity to encourage many fonns of life other than human forms.
Humans are one species of the several million whose intricate relationships constitute what we think of as "nature." To asSUIre that the system of nature is simpler than one of its canponent parts--humanity--was never reasonable, and it has now becane canpletely absurd in the light of the ecological knowledge of nature I s cx::mplexity.
Similarly, wanan no longer seems the simple =eature she has often been thought to be. In addition to giving birth, ~sU19 children, and keeping house, waren also experience canplex states of consciousness and are fully capable of urrlerstanding and of creating intellectual, spiritual, and a..-tlstic experiences of a high order.
Wanen can be quite as responsible before the world as men and are no longer likely to be content merely to serve the interests of individual men or those of a collective of male-dan:inated s0-ciety.
Traditional IOOral categories also fail to agree with what is now known about nature and has always been known about wanen.
The seductiveness and seductability of Eve are no IOOre typical of wanen than are the spirituali ty and ~ity of Mary.
Like men, waren are capable of both corruption and ccrnpassion and of the many gradations of hate and affection, deception and honesty, selfishness and altruism which make up the IOOral rep::>rtoire of humanity.
Neither the top nor the bottan of a hierarchical IOOral scale is a suitable niche for wanan, though she has seldan been allowed any other choices.
In the same way, nature has been jooged to be either fundamentally evil or divinely perfect. Pastoral scenes of IOOral perfection are no IOOre accurate about nature than are the grisly scenes of brutality imagined by Social Darwinists who interpret "survival of the fittest" as if it referred to a gigantic Darwinian Donnybrook.
Neither nature nor wanan is inherently evil, nor inherently pure.
I t is also untrue that undeveloped land and wanen ImlSt be managed by men in order to achiever their full p::>tentials, though our laws and custans persist in this assumption. Wilderness land supports IOOre life and achieves rrore ecological elegance than farms can ever know, and with better prospects for stability and future growth.
Land manages itself better than bureaus of land management can.
Similarly, shrews--....hether two-or four-legged--can fulfill their lives without being tam:rl by men, especially if taming has no better p.rrpose than to affinn male power. Wanen and wilderness have alike been forced to sutmit to male management "for their own good" but to the loss of their inherent integrities.
Power has traditionally grown out of the barrel of a penis.
Rigid male machines poke at the earth pretending to fertilize it, heedless of the destruction of delicate tis-Natural hierarchies are nornally fOtUld only within given groups of conspecifics. '!be rank-order in a IOOngoose colony applies only to members of that colony, and it does not even affect neighboring colonies of IOOngooses, let alone other species living in the same area.
Similarly, wanan no longer seems the simple =eature she has often been thought to be. In addition to giving birth,~sU19 chil- Neither the top nor the bottan of a hierarchical IOOral scale is a suitable niche for wanan, though she has seldan been allowed any other choices.
Rigid male machines poke at the earth pretending to fertilize it, heedless of the destruction of delicate tissues. Possessing nature is the entertainment of all-male gangs of engineers, m:mntaineers, miners and frontiersmen who leave their wanen at hane when they set out, weapons at the ready, to ravish ~ther Nature. Ostensibly, the girls are left behind to spare them dan ger, but the mutual admiration typical of men in such gangs is enough to explain why the conquest of nature has been ITOstly a mascu line sport. Nature is the wanan men ITOunt in plblic to display their prowess before one another, while wives are screwed at hane to affirm male supremacy over females.
A screw is an engineering device used to hold things in place.
Nature has been assumed to exist only to serve humanity's needs, just as woman exists to serve man's. Both have been thought of as camodities, resources to be mined.
Adam received daninion over nature and over Eve, both gifts of Go::l. From the raw materials of nature and wanan, Adam was supposed to fa shion heaven using his male tools.
So, his descendants pla.red the earth, and they plowed their wives, for both were properties needing improvement before their benefits could be realized.
As Rene Dubas once put it, "Man can manipulate nature to his best interests only if he first loves her for her own sake" [1] --as if there were no contradiction between love and profitable manipulation.
Exploitation is not the only purpose guiding wan's relation to nature and woman, for he has also found pleasure and beauty in both. Both have been thought of as enriching ornaments on the bare bones of life. Both offer relief from rronotony and ugliness, comfort after struggle, and the titillations of sensual pleasure.
National parks, like beauty queens, are set aside as inviolate specimens and fenced from the uses of indivi dual men, so that all may ogle them equally. Pride is also at work even in such preserva tions of pleasure, for parks and queens alike serve as status displays proving that those who are rich and powerful can afford to main tain beautiful and useless objects merely for the pleasure they will provide.
Perhaps the simplest way to surrmarize the conventional imagery of woman and nature if is merely to repeat a few typical sentences in which the feminine pronoun can be indis criminately replaced by either word: nature or woman.
She is corrupt, because she is exclusively biological and, thus, incapable of spirit or rroral responsibility.
She re presents physical existence, and metafhysics helps to transcend her. Yet her image and her environs often inspire men toward Splrl tual achievement.
She represents fertility when she is properly cultivated and death or danger when she is permitted to remain wild. Taming her is man's task on earth, the ful fillment of which affirms his maleness. She is a prize to be won by males in battle, and she is a source of male repose when the battle has been won.
She was provided by a male god to be man's servant.
Her influence tempts man to sin and inspires him to his salvation. Such mix-and-match metafhors have provided western culture with a unified way to think about woman and nature and to regu late the status and rights of both.
A con sistent axiom of our culture affirms that nature is to mankind as women are to men.
A revolution has begun which challenges the traditional status accorded to women and to nature. Both have been canpromised beyond their endurance and made to bear unbearable burdens.
Water and air have accepted enor rrous quantities of humanity's poisons, and now they have begun to kill us with our own contaminants.
They do so incidentally and without malice; nature is merely announcing that it can take no more of our crap. That is also rrodern woman's message to men, but women speak from a reservoir of anger that is unknown to nature.
Women are capable of revenge as the ecosfhere is not.
From both sources, the message is increasingly clear: the world is not well served by a hierarchy that relegates natural processes and females to subordinate levels with no rights to pro tect them from abuse.
Of course, Reversing the hierarchy will not solve the problem.
It would be no im provement if nature were to dominate mankind or if wanen were to dominate Iren. It is the hierarchy itself that seems inadequate, h0w ever it my be organized.
In its place is emerging a recognition that systems unlike one's own must enjoy the right to fulfillment according to their own inherent needs. Males must begin to learn how to recognize and respond to the genuine needs of females, just as humanity must discover how to honor the canplex structures of natural ecology. sta tus is no longer appropriate for the determi nation of rights, and it never was.
Natural creatures do not enjoy any sta tus beyond that earned arrong the :i.nmedi.ate members of their own species. \'blves are not 27 BEIWEEN THE SPEX::.IES I I if sues. Possessing nature is the entertainment of all-male gangs of engineers, m:mntaineers, miners and frontiersmen who leave their wanen at hane when they set out, weapons at the ready, to ravish~ther Nature. Ostensibly, the girls are left behind to spare them danger, but the mutual admiration typical of men in such gangs is enough to explain why the conquest of nature has been ITOstly a masculine sport. Nature is the wanan men ITOunt in plblic to display their prowess before one another, while wives are screwed at hane to affirm male supremacy over females.
Adam received daninion over nature and over Eve, both gifts of Go::l. From the raw materials of nature and wanan, Adam was supposed to fashion heaven using his male tools.
National parks, like beauty queens, are set aside as inviolate specimens and fenced from the uses of individual men, so that all may ogle them equally. Pride is also at work even in such preservations of pleasure, for parks and queens alike serve as status displays proving that those who are rich and powerful can afford to maintain beautiful and useless objects merely for the pleasure they will provide.
Perhaps the simplest way to surrmarize the conventional imagery of woman and nature is merely to repeat a few typical sentences in which the feminine pronoun can be indiscriminately replaced by either word: nature or woman.
She re-27 presents physical existence, and metafhysics helps to transcend her. Yet her image and her environs often inspire men toward Splrltual achievement.
She represents fertility when she is properly cultivated and death or danger when she is permitted to remain wild. Taming her is man's task on earth, the fulfillment of which affirms his maleness. She is a prize to be won by males in battle, and she is a source of male repose when the battle has been won.
Her influence tempts man to sin and inspires him to his salvation. Such mix-and-match metafhors have provided Western culture with a unified way to think about woman and nature and to regulate the status and rights of both.
A consistent axiom of our culture affirms that nature is to mankind as women are to men.
Water and air have accepted enorrrous quantities of humanity's poisons, and now they have begun to kill us with our own contaminants.
From both sources, the message is increasingly clear: the world is not well served by a hierarchy that relegates natural processes and females to subordinate levels with no rights to protect them from abuse.
It would be no improvement if nature were to dominate mankind or if waren were to dominate Iren. It is the hierarchy itself that seems inadequate, h0w-ever it my be organized.
In its place is emerging a recognition that systems unlike one's own must enjoy the right to fulfillment according to their own inherent needs. Males must begin to learn how to recognize and respond to the genuine needs of females, just as humanity must discover how to honor the canplex structures of natural ecology. status is no longer appropriate for the determination of rights, and it never was.
Natural creatures do not enjoy any status beyond that earned arrong the :i.nmedi.ate members of their own species. \'blves are not ----superior to the rabbits they prey uIXXl or to the envirooment they live in, fX)r do they enjoy any special rights within their sur rounding ea::>systems.
A wolf's status is fixed by cal\PE!tition with the other wolves in its clan and is not significant beyond the contiguous social group.
Effective group hunting simply requires leadership and the exercise of authority.
Fortunately, wolves cannot elevate their status structures into cosmic hierarchies, as people have done.
Non-hierarchical systans of classifica tion are worth examining.
several are a vailable to us fran the ancient past and fran cultural traditions other than our 0NIl.
CA1e such system has been pieced together fran the remains of Paleolithic art dating between 30,000 B.C. and 10,000 B.C. Paleoli thic art represents ancient human values and patterns of thought before these were nodi fied by the powerful forces of agricultural civilization and intellectual culture. Pa leolithic art .antedates agriculture and the dcmestication of animals, and it represents a way of life based uIXXl hunting and close coordination between human affairs and na tural ecology.
Paleolithic art is primitive only in the sense that it is very old. It is not simple, nor is it confined to representations of Illlmdane activities or observed objects and events. Rather, it displays a subtle symbol ic node of thought which remained consistent ly expressive of human sensibilities for a period of sane twenty thousand years.
'lbe stability of this artistic tradition rested uIXXl a dualistic, non-hierarchical system which classified all living creatures accord ing to gender in a single symbolic scheme.
'lbere is no Paleolithic pornograIily displaying sexual relations between zren and wanen. 'lbe caves are not nonuzrents to sexual conquests, nor do they display images of sexual fertility and voluptuousness. Aston ishingly, "there is not a single scene of human copulation in all Paleolithic art, not even a single instance of an i thYIilallic figure in close proximity to a female fi gure." [2] There is, however, a "fundamental principle of pairing" • there are male and female animal figures whose actions do not overtly allooe to sexual reproduction, but whose male and female qualities are in dispensably cunplementary. " [3] H'lmans are artXlllg these male and female symbols, but they are by no means daninant. Along with the animals, humans take their place in a larger sexual classification of all life forms.
Genital
and reproductive aspects of sexuality are minor and inconsequential fea tures of Paleolithic art.
Male and female are significant categories of life because of the different values and behavior that they represent.
'lbey stand for a world that is ordered according to alternation, complemen tarity, and antagonism between two principles which occupy equal halves of a horizontal scale.
Differential functions, rather than differential status, are the significant criteria for organization.
Paleolithic taxonany (unlike that of Aristotle or Linnaeus) seems to be based upon the proposition that variations in behavior and temperazrent are rrnre important principles of classification than variation in anatany and physiology.
In such a system, gender is the guiding principle, for there are only two large classes of life: male and female. Gender cuts across species lines, uniting all creatures in a continuous scale of existence. This proposition raises for us sane inter esting questions: do male humans have llOre in CCIl1IlOl1 with male apes than with female humans? Is a nursing human llOther llOre simi 1ar to a nursing wolf llOther than to her 0NIl husband?
Such questions seem bizarre Only because of our long cultural addiction to hierarchical scales based ulXXl structural criteria. 'lbey are worth reconsidering after thirty thousand years of neglect.
'lbe Paleolithic system of classification can be reconstructed only by inference for the arts and actions of ancient hunting peo ples.
Although it may have been systematic and comprehensive, it is not articulated in a lxrly of literature or law.
If nodels of dynamic order were to be found only in such cultures, we would have to assume that they are only appropriate to the circumstance of hunting and gathering, and perhaps not ap plicable to the refined cultures of civilized human life.
There is at least one example, however, of a systemic cosrrology based upon gender symbolism developed by a highly 50 pusticated culture that is fare fran hunting and gathering: Chinese Taoism.
'lbe Chinese Book of Tao describes a structural nodel of the world which was pre sent in the cultural traditions of China for
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Non-hierarchical systans of classification are worth examining.
several
sexual fertility and voluptuousness.
Astonishingly, "there is not a single scene of human copulation in all Paleolithic art, not even a single instance of an i thYIilallic figure in close proximity to a female figure." [2] There is, however, a "fundamental principle of pairing" • there are male and female animal figures whose actions do not overtly allooe to sexual reproduction, but whose male and female qualities are indispensably cunplementary. " [3] H'lmans are
CA1e such system has been pieced together fran the remains of Paleolithic art dating between 30,000 B.C. and 10,000 B.C. Paleolithic art represents ancient human values and patterns of thought before these were nodified by the powerful forces of agricultural civilization and intellectual culture.
Paleolithic art .antedates agriculture and the dcmestication of animals, and it represents a way of life based uIXXl hunting and close coordination between human affairs and natural ecology.
artXlllg these male and female symbols, but they are by no means daninant.
Along with the animals, humans take their place in a larger sexual classification of all life forms.
'lbe Paleolithic system of classification can be reconstructed only by inference for the arts and actions of ancient hunting peoples.
If nodels of dynamic order were to be found only in such cultures, we would have to assume that they are only appropriate to the circumstance of hunting and gathering, and perhaps not applicable to the refined cultures of civilized human life.
There is at least one example, however, of a systemic cosrrology based upon gender symbolism developed by a highly 50-pusticated culture that is fare fran hunting and gathering: Chinese Taoism.
Genital
and reproductive aspects of sexuality are minor and inconsequential features of Paleolithic art.
'lbey stand for a world that is ordered according to alternation, complementarity, and antagonism between two principles which occupy equal halves of a horizontal scale.
'lbe Chinese Book of Tao describes a ----structural nodel of the world which was present in the cultural traditions of China for Paleolithic taxonany (unlike that of Aristotle or Linnaeus) seems to be based upon the proposition that variations in behavior and temperazrent are rrnre important principles of classification than variation in anatany and physiology.
In such a system, gender is the guiding principle, for there are only two large classes of life: male and female. Gender cuts across species lines, uniting all creatures in a continuous scale of existence. This proposition raises for us sane interesting questions:
do male humans have llOre in CCIl1IlOl1 with male apes than with female humans? Is a nursing human llOther llOre simi1ar to a nursing wolf llOther than to her 0NIl husband?
is no Paleolithic pornograIily sexual relations between zren and caves are not nonuzrents to sexual nor do they display images of 'lbere displaying wanen. 'lbe conquests, Paleolithic art is primitive only in the sense that it is very old. It is not simple, nor is it confined to representations of Illlmdane activities or observed objects and events. Rather, it displays a subtle symbolic node of thought which remained consistently expressive of human sensibilities for a period of sane twenty thousand years.
'lbe stability of this artistic tradition rested uIXXl a dualistic, non-hierarchical system which classified all living creatures according to gender in a single symbolic scheme. many centuries before its articulation by Lao Tzu around the fifth century B.C.
The con cept of life as a "way" (Tao) and the p:>lari ties yin and yang were present at the ear liest stages of recurded Chinese thought in the third rnillenium B.C., [4] and they may rest up:>n much older structures, like those of Paleolithic art.
Whatever its origins, Taoism's concepts corresp:>nd in i..rnpJrtant ways to the implicit pulosophy of Paleoli thic hunting culture, and with other ancient concepts of world order which deserve to be re-examined in our time, as we search for a new eculogical view of the nature of things.
The world as described by Taoism con sists essentially of processes, not of things.
Objects and organisms are media through which process (Tao) becx::Koos manifest, just as language is one medium through which thought becanes manifest, but neither things nor language are equivalent to the processes which they partially represent.
Taoist cosmology offers a model of the world based upon modes of action and rela tionship which are reciprocal rather than hierarchic.
status is not significant in this system, for all of its essential can ponents are of equal importance:
Tao is great Heaven is great Earth is great And the king [representing mankind] is also great. There are four great things in the uni verse, and the king is one of them.
[5]
The four great canpanents of reality are not =rnpetitive but canplementary and imitative of one another:
Man models himself after the Earth, Earth models itself after Heaven, Heaven models itself after Tao. And Tao models itself after Nature.
[6]
Taoism insists that relationships anong the canponents of reality must be mutually can plementary. Integrative processes within the cyclic system of the universe are essential to Taoism, but the relative status of its various parts is inconsequential.
Neither does the evolutionary chronology of Taoist thought presuppose a status hierar chy based upon priority in time or a destiny intended to glorify one canponent of reality over others. Instead, Taoism describes mere ly a process of increasing canplexity:
Tao produced the Q1e. The Q1e produced the two. The two produced the three. And the three produced the ten thousand things.
[7]
The "ten thousand things" inclooe all the fonns and species of the earth, with no spe cial status reserved for mankind. The things of the earth are not organized according to a nature-man-god hierarchy, as in the Western chain of being, but according to the balanced p:>larity of yin and yang:
The ten thousand things carry the yin and embrace the yang, and through the blending of the material force they achieve hanoony.
[8]
Harrrony is achieved through blending, rather than status being achieved through conquest. Taoism is a dynamic ethic, rather than a rationale for triumph.
Yin and yang are female and male prin ciples independent of sexual geI¥.l.er. Like the symbols in the caves of Paleolithic hun ters, yin and yang divide the world's fonns into two canplernentary categories according to their modes of being and action, without regard for their species, status, or sexuali ty.
Yin is passivity, yang is activity; yin is space, and yang is surrounding fonn; yin is receptive, and yang is contributive; yin is fluid, and yang is its container. In Paleolithic symbolism, yin is the wotmd, and yang is the spear.
In the emerging vocabu lary of modern brain research, yin yang are names for the right and left hemispheres of the human brain. In all, male and female are organizing principles applicable to a total and integrated model of world reality.
Pre requisite to such integration is the need to view things as they are:
• the person Should be viewed as a person and the world should be viewed as the world. The concept of life as a "way" (Tao) and the p:>lari-ties yin and yang were present at the earliest stages of recurded Chinese thought in the third rnillenium B.C., [4] and they may rest up:>n much older structures, like those of Paleolithic art.
Whatever its origins, Taoism's concepts corresp:>nd in i..rnpJrtant ways to the implicit pulosophy of Paleolithic hunting culture, and with other ancient concepts of world order which deserve to be re-examined in our time, as we search for a new eculogical view of the nature of things.
The world as described by Taoism consists essentially of processes, not of things.
Taoist cosmology offers a model of the world based upon modes of action and relationship which are reciprocal rather than hierarchic.
status is not significant in this system, for all of its essential canponents are of equal importance:
Tao is great Heaven is great Earth is great And the king [representing mankind] is also great. There are four great things in the universe, and the king is one of them.
Taoism insists that relationships anong the canponents of reality must be mutually canplementary. Integrative processes within the cyclic system of the universe are essential to Taoism, but the relative status of its various parts is inconsequential.
Neither does the evolutionary chronology of Taoist thought presuppose a status hierarchy based upon priority in time or a destiny intended to glorify one canponent of reality 29 over others. Instead, Taoism describes merely a process of increasing canplexity:
The "ten thousand things" inclooe all the fonns and species of the earth, with no special status reserved for mankind. The things of the earth are not organized according to a nature-man-god hierarchy, as in the Western chain of being, but according to the balanced p:>larity of yin and yang:
Yin and yang are female and male principles independent of sexual geI¥.l.er. Like the symbols in the caves of Paleolithic hunters, yin and yang divide the world's fonns into two canplernentary categories according to their modes of being and action, without regard for their species, status, or sexuality.
In the emerging vocabulary of modern brain research, yin yang are names for the right and left hemispheres of the human brain. In all, male and female are organizing principles applicable to a total and integrated model of world reality.
Prerequisite to such integration is the need to view things as they are:
• the person Should be viewed as a person and the world should be viewed as the world. Science appears to be a:mfirming the implicit PlilosoPlies of Paleolithic art and the ways of life camon arrong ancient and lOCldern hunting peoples, not to mention the patterns which govern the lives of many non human animals.
None of these deeply-rooted traditions guarantees special rights to human beings which contradict the rights of other species or of the natural envirornnent.
Rights in such systems are based on inherent natural characteristics which re quire expression and fulfillment. Since these characteristics are subject to change according to time curl circumstance, rights are necessarily as variable as the contexts in which they are exercised.
water on a slope has a "right" to flow downhill, because it is its nature to do so; water in a shel tered pool has a right to quiescence, for the same reason.
Rights are inherent in the physics, the chemistry, the Plylogeny , the anatany~ the Plysiology, and the ecology of things--in other ItfUrds, in their Tao.
In groups of natural things, the exer cise of individual Tao is often canpetitive with curl restrictive of other Tao.
water's right to rtn1 downhill, for instance, treaI1S abridgement of the hill's right to retain its contours, for it is eroded in the process. Big fish deny the right to life of smaller fish. Wind blows according to its stonrry Tao curl prohibits water fran remaining placid even in sheltered pools. When I1Ullti.ple func tions exist, as they always do in ecosystems, the rights of individual canponents I1UlSt be subordinated to the requirements of the over all environment.
The rights of integrated systems necessarily take priority over the rights of individual ccrnponents, not because systffilS have higher status, but because their conditions of systemic balance are an aggre gate of their constituent organisms. 'lll.e Tao of systems is collective.
Temporal order, too, has its own sys temic integrity.
'lll.e evolution of species I1Ulst take precedence over the growth of indi viduals, and the processes of succession in ecosystems I1UlSt enjoy the right to proceed, even to the abridgement of the rights of any participating species. Evolution curl su=es sion are not status hierarchies, rot cyclic temporal chronologies.
Early stages in both are essential to the overall process, and the fact that they may be "primitive" in fonn does not lessen their importance.
'lll.e first fireweed to grCM upon newly erupted volcanic ash is as essential as the ponderous pine which will daninate a climax ecosystem on the same site ten centuries later.
'lll.e first PlilosoPler is as important as the m:>st re cent one.
Rights in ecosystems are functions of the particular successional stage the system has reached at any given time--that is, rights are variable according to the candi tion of the environment.
When rabbits are abundant, lynx enjoy a right to rapid repro duction, which is later withdrawn when the rabbit population declines.
'lll.e fireweed's right to propagate its kind over new soil disappears when botanical su=ession has restore a lIDre ccmplex vegetation on the site.
On a larger time scale, the righ'.:s of dinosaurs to evolve as a species was denied by the environmental conditions of Pleisto cene glaciation.
tb individual organisms, and probably no species, enjoy an inalienable right to live when their ways of life are contrary to their environmental circumstances.
Of the billion or lIDre species which have existed at one tiJre or other on the earth, only about one percent nCM survive.
Those that do survive earned their durability by adapting to envi ronmental change, not because of their supe rior status, and not because of their ability to rranipulate environments for their own welfare.
The rights of non-human nature are not, and never have been, uncertain, except in the thoughts of humans.
They are canplex and variable, but they are finnly established upon the foundation of evolutionary history. Natural rights are enforced by the biological systems governing plant curl animal evolution and distriOOtion and by the necessary corres pondence between natural rights and their environmental contexts.
'lll.e only species to suffer genuine confusion about its rights is our own.
We have lost confidence in our instincts and have devised ways to contradict and suppress them.
We lack sensitivity to our environments, and we feel free to IOOdify them to conform with our conceptual lOCldels of reality.
We lack kncMledge of our rights as a biological species, and of the responsibi lities which accanpany them.
Human behavior can reasonably be tested by asking whether specific acts or patterns of behavior occur in non-human species as well.
Acts which have sane counterpart in
SOPly. Science appears to be a:mfirming the implicit PlilosoPlies of Paleolithic art and the ways of life camon arrong ancient and lOCldern hunting peoples, not to mention the patterns which govern the lives of many nonhuman animals.
Rights in such systems are based on inherent natural characteristics which require expression and fulfillment. Since these characteristics are subject to change according to time curl circumstance, rights are necessarily as variable as the contexts in which they are exercised.
Water on a slope has a "right" to flow downhill, because it is its nature to do so; water in a sheltered pool has a right to quiescence, for the same reason.
Rights are inherent in the physics, the chemistry, the Plylogeny , the anatany~the Plysiology, and the ecology of things--in other ItfUrds, in their Tao.
In groups of natural things, the exercise of individual Tao is often canpetitive with curl restrictive of other Tao.
Water's right to rtn1 downhill, for instance, treaI1S abridgement of the hill's right to retain its contours, for it is eroded in the process. Big fish deny the right to life of smaller fish. Wind blows according to its stonrry Tao curl prohibits water fran remaining placid even in sheltered pools. When I1Ullti.ple functions exist, as they always do in ecosystems, the rights of individual canponents I1UlSt be subordinated to the requirements of the overall environment.
The rights of integrated systems necessarily take priority over the rights of individual ccrnponents, not because systffilS have higher status, but because their conditions of systemic balance are an aggregate of their constituent organisms. 'lll.e Tao of systems is collective.
Temporal order, too, has its own systemic integrity.
'lll.e evolution of species I1Ulst take precedence over the growth of individuals, and the processes of succession in ecosystems I1UlSt enjoy the right to proceed, even to the abridgement of the rights of any participating species. Evolution curl su=es-sion are not status hierarchies, rot cyclic temporal chronologies.
'lll.e first PlilosoPler is as important as the m:>st recent one.
Rights in ecosystems are functions of the particular successional stage the system has reached at any given time--that is, rights are variable according to the candition of the environment.
When rabbits are abundant, lynx enjoy a right to rapid reproduction, which is later withdrawn when the rabbit population declines.
On a larger time scale, the righ'.:s of dinosaurs to evolve as a species was denied by the environmental conditions of Pleistocene glaciation.
Those that do survive earned their durability by adapting to environmental change, not because of their superior status, and not because of their ability to rranipulate environments for their own welfare.
They are canplex and variable, but they are finnly established upon the foundation of evolutionary history. Natural rights are enforced by the biological systems governing plant curl animal evolution and distriOOtion and by the necessary correspondence between natural rights and their environmental contexts.
We lack kncMledge of our rights as a biological species, and of the responsibilities which accanpany them.
Acts which have sane counterpart in other an.im3.ls may be tentatively assumed to enjoy a basic validity, possibly based upon a cc.mtDI1 evolutionary history shared by humans and by other animals which have evolved be fore us and with us. Property and ownership, for instance, seem to be important to many territorial species.
Whether humans are a territorial species, however, remains in doubt.
It is fXJSsible that our custans of land Cffmership and the social systems built upon these custans express ancient and in stinctual human patterns, or that they are the COIlSe:JUences of an agricultural way of life dating back only a few thousand years. Territoriality can, perhaps, be understood better when we know roore about its importance to our near evolutionary neighbors, the other primates, and roore about the anthropology of our non-agricultural human ancestors. Terri torial rights reside in a grey area which has not yet been ade:J\}ately explored.
'!he right to kill other animals for food, however, is impossible to deny to any carnivorous species.
Sane doubt may exist that hLlma~s are naturally carnivorous, but, the antiquity and universality of human hun ting are sufficient to affirm that killing animals of another species for food is a basic behavioral pattern of hLllllani ty, as firmly established as the hunting rights of bears or other ClIlU'livores.
When we kill for purposes other than food, however, or when we kill members of our Cffm species, then we are on shaky ground.
Hunting for entertainment or recreation is difficult to justify on precedents fran other predatory species; the killing of conspecifics by marder or warfare is even roore rare; and killing for purposes of revenge is virtually unknCffm apart fran the abundant examples provided by human his tory.
Only humans can visit the iniquities of their fathers unto the sons of the third or fourth generation.
Behavior that is seemingly unique to our species, such as revenge killing, re:JUires detailed examination to determine whether it is rooted in unique conditions attending the evolutionary differentiation of humans fran other animals, or if it rests upon p..rrely intellectual models of realitv which lack any biological basis. Clearly, revenge is possi ble only for a species capable of l1lE!Il\Jry and imagination.
It is, therefore, made availa ble to us arrvng the special functions of the human brain. '!he question, then, is whether it is also a necessary and appropriate fea ture of our species in the light of evolu tionary history and the re:JUirerrents of envi rornnental adaptation. Does revenge behavior enhance the prospects for our species 1 does it help to fit us better into the world ecosfhere?
Or is it, as seens roore likely, an abberation of human mentality that serves to estrange us fran one another and fran the world around us?
sane forms of human behavior are so blatantly out of step with natural patterns of existence that no precedent whatsoever can be found for them anywhere in natural his tory.
Volcanoes may add lethal chemicals to the atIrosfhere for brief periods, but they cannot pretend to destroy as many forms of life as the industrial pollution of the past two centuries. No other species can systema tically destroy the other animal species which compete with it or cause it nuisance.
No other species can extract quantities of oil and minerals fran the lithosfhere, or add poisons and wastes to it as ours can.
And none save humans can overpop.liate the entire world sufficiently to destroy species diver sity and to muddle the integrity of the en tire world ecosfhere. Only in the past few centuries have humans aaruired these dan gerous skills in actual fact, although the enabling laws and ideologies fran which they have grCffm are, perhaps, three or four thou sand years old.
Humans cannot "bestow" rights upon non human nature any roore than men can prescribe the rights appropriate to waren.
Models of the world which as~ a status hierarchy aroong =eatures of different kinds do vio lence to the rights of all =eatures, even to those who have made a place for themselves at the top. Yin and yang offer a roore pranising concept of world order than top and bottom have ever provided. Without sane such fhilo sofhy that is consistent with the natural history of the world, the rights of humans and non-humans alike will remain in jeopardy. 1he ethics governing our attitooes toward nature govern also our relationships with other human beings. evolutionary history shared by humans and by other animals which have evolved before us and with us. Property and ownership, for instance, seem to be important to many territorial species.
It is fXJSsible that our custans of land Cffmership and the social systems built upon these custans express ancient and instinctual human patterns, or that they are the COIlSe:JUences of an agricultural way of life dating back only a few thousand years. Territoriality can, perhaps, be understood better when we know roore about its importance to our near evolutionary neighbors, the other primates, and roore about the anthropology of our non-agricultural human ancestors. Territorial rights reside in a grey area which has not yet been ade:J\}ately explored.
Sane doubt may exist that hLlma~s are naturally carnivorous, but, the antiquity and universality of human hunting are sufficient to affirm that killing animals of another species for food is a basic behavioral pattern of hLllllani ty, as firmly established as the hunting rights of bears or other ClIlU'livores.
Hunting for entertainment or recreation is difficult to justify on precedents fran other predatory species; the killing of conspecifics by marder or warfare is even roore rare; and killing for purposes of revenge is virtually unknCffm apart fran the abundant examples provided by human history.
Behavior that is seemingly unique to our species, such as revenge killing, re:JUires detailed examination to determine whether it is rooted in unique conditions attending the evolutionary differentiation of humans fran other animals, or if it rests upon p..rrely intellectual models of realitv which lack any biological basis. Clearly, revenge is possible only for a species capable of l1lE!Il\Jry and imagination.
It is, therefore, made available to us arrvng the special functions of the human brain. '!he question, then, is whether it is also a necessary and appropriate feature of our species in the light of evolu-31 tionary history and the re:JUirerrents of envirornnental adaptation. Does revenge behavior enhance the prospects for our species 1 does it help to fit us better into the world ecosfhere?
Or is it, as seens roore likely, an abberation of human mentality that serves to estrange us fran one another and fran the world around us? sane forms of human behavior are so blatantly out of step with natural patterns of existence that no precedent whatsoever can be found for them anywhere in natural history.
Volcanoes may add lethal chemicals to the atIrosfhere for brief periods, but they cannot pretend to destroy as many forms of life as the industrial pollution of the past two centuries. No other species can systematically destroy the other animal species which compete with it or cause it nuisance.
And none save humans can overpop.liate the entire world sufficiently to destroy species diversity and to muddle the integrity of the entire world ecosfhere. Only in the past few centuries have humans aaruired these dangerous skills in actual fact, although the enabling laws and ideologies fran which they have grCffm are, perhaps, three or four thousand years old.
Humans cannot "bestow" rights upon nonhuman nature any roore than men can prescribe the rights appropriate to waren.
Models of the world which as~a status hierarchy aroong =eatures of different kinds do violence to the rights of all =eatures, even to those who have made a place for themselves at the top. Yin and yang offer a roore pranising concept of world order than top and bottom have ever provided. Without sane such fhilosofhy that is consistent with the natural history of the world, the rights of humans and non-humans alike will remain in jeopardy. 1he ethics governing our attitooes toward nature govern also our relationships with other human beings. For the i.rrrnediate future, I anticipate working primarily on the treatment of animals in science, not because there aren't other areas of pressing concern, but because it is the area I knCM best.
Then, too, despite frequent lapses, scientists are professionally coumitted to abiding by the rule of reason and are, thus, amenable to rational and scientific persuasion. Where profits and bottan line are, as it were, the bottan line, as in animal agriculture or in horse-racing, rational argument is obviously not the IOClst effective force for change.
In addition to the all-import-...ant IOClral dimension, it seems clear to me that the issue of animal use in science teaches us much about the nature of science. For if, as scientists frequently say, contemporary bioIT¥3di.cine is essentially dependent on invasive use of animals, surely they cannot also claim as part of the ideology of science that science is value-free, since every such invasive use of animals presupposes the m:>ral judgment that the benefit gained by science is of greater value than or trumps the animal pain or suffering.
Also, the scientist's ability to ignore the camon sense demands of IOClrality when dealing with laboratory animals is itself a fascinating fhenanenon, based in part upon a widespread notion integral to the ideology of science that one can make no judgments about animal feelings and awareness and that imputatien of consciousness to animals is anthropaInqilic and scientifically meaningless.
This in t.urn leads to bizarre Cartesian claims that ani.mcls don't really feel pain; they cnly "vocalize" or "ShCM aversive behavior. n My nnst recent work is designed to confute the orthodox view that claims about animal minds are meaningless and to ShCM that it was basically an indefensible historical accident, inconsistent with fundamental biological premises, but pragmatically expedient, which led to a denial of mentation to animals.
In this way, I hope not only to change the scientific gestalt on animal consciousness but to shed light on the less than rational manner in which scientific change takes place.
As the concept of local and public review of animal research gains credence, people will becc:ire increasingly aware, as, indeed, they have in the human research area, that IOClral deliberations are not bull-sessions and do not take place in a vacuum. This, hope, will in turn ensure that the tissue of questions surrounding these IOClral issues about animals will becane the object of serious study and research and, correlatively, receives academic respectability and a place for study in institutions of higher learning. cnly in this way can such issues becane a permanent and legitimate area of enIfhasis in a democratic society.
continued from page 31 I been featured in magazines, and helped develop courses of study.
I have seen people at their stupidest and nnst intransigent, yet I have also, en many occasions, seen the efficacy of reason and witnessed the tritnnP1 of decency over self-interest.
In the midst of all of this tumult, I have been fortunate, indeed, to enjoy the security of a stable hare life and have benefitted fran living with a wife and son (born in 1979), both of whan are considerably brighter than I am.
(By the time my wife, a matherratician, has finished going over my papers and speeches and rubbed my nose in every conceptual flaw, I am IOClrally certain all my bases are covered and am prepared to face anyone.) My little boy has attended my speeches and lectures so often that he has only to hear the word "ethical" and he falls instantly aaleep. When I gave the C. W. H~Meirorial Lecture at Kings College, London, in fact, he sat erect in the first rCM, much to the amazement of the audience, apparently absorbed in the lecture, and slept quietly fran the first sentence on, to be awakened only by the applause, in which he enthusiastically took part.
For the i.rrrnediate future, I anticipate working primarily on the treatment of animals in science, not because there aren't other areas of pressing concern, but because it is the area I knCM best.
As the concept of local and public review of animal research gains credence, people will becc:ire increasingly aware, as, indeed, they have in the human research area, that IOClral deliberations are not bull-sessions and do not take place in a vacuum.
This, I hope, will in turn ensure that the tissue of questions surrounding these IOClral issues about animals will becane the object of serious study and research and, correlatively, receives academic respectability and a place for study in institutions of higher learning. cnly in this way can such issues becane a permanent and legitimate area of enIfhasis in a democratic society.
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